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Charles W. Howe*, Paul K. Alexander,** and Raphael J. Moses***

The Performance of Appropriative
Water Rights Systems in the Western
United States During Drought
I. INTRODUCTION

The systems of water law known as the riparian and the appropriation
doctrines differ considerably in their implications for water allocation
during periods of water shortage. The western states have generally adopted
some form of appropriation doctrine.' The West also experiences the
lowest average annual precipitation and the most variable seasonal and
annual precipitation patterns as compared to other regions. Thus, an
understanding of the actual and potential performance of appropriation
systems of water rights during periods of water shortage is crucial to
improved response to shortages.
The efficiency implications of water rights systems have received relatively little economic analysis. Hartman and Seastone2 analyzed the
conditions necessary for the maximization of total benefits from water
use on a river in the presence of return flows. They pointed out that a
system allowing unfettered transferability of water rights would not account for impacts on users of return flows and could yield inefficient
allocations of water. They further pointed out that the legal procedures
established to protect third parties from the effects of changes in uses
and/or points of diversion can involve substantial costs and delays, perhaps making transfers unduly difficult and thus inefficient.
Hartman and Seastone also provided a valuable comparative analysis
of alternative institutional arrangements for the distribution and reallocation of water. They compared the economic efficiency of the procedures
evolved by the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District (distributor
of the Colorado-Big Thompson Project Water) with the economic efficiency of the procedures initially used by the newer Southeastern Colorado
Water Conservancy District (distributor of Frying Pan-Arkansas water).
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Callaway3 has provided an extensive economic efficiency analysis of
alternative ways of allocating surface flows among users. His analysis
considered quota systems, allocation by marginal value product, "rental
markets," and saleable water rights. Callaway's analysis takes into account the timing of flows and return flows as well as the locations of
water uses of different economic values and priorities. 4
Burness and Quirk5 investigated the possibility of efficient water allocation under appropriation doctrine through competitive market processes. Their analysis represents the only attempt to deal with large
numbers of water users and the existence of competitive equilibria in
such systems. However, their abstraction from the diversity of water uses,
the complexity of return flows, and the sequential nature of the establishment of priorities make generalizations from their results difficult.
A recently completed study by Howe, Alexander, et al, 6 has further
illuminated some of the problems encountered under Colorado water law
during periods of drought. The study also addresses possibilities for improving the economic efficiency of response to drought.
The next two sections of this paper explain the principles of economically efficient water allocation among users and compare practices under
appropriations doctrine with these principles, particularly to identify the
sources of inefficiency during drought. The fourth section then describes
some of the practices that have developed outside of appropriations doctrine proper to avert some of these inefficiencies. The final section then
proposes other fundamental changes in water management institutions to
further improve the efficiency of water allocation under the appropriation
doctrine.
II. A SIMPLIFIED MODEL OF ECONOMICALLY EFFICIENT
ALLOCATION OF RIVER WATER AMONG USERS
The following model is presented simply as a review of the basic
principles required for the benefit-maximizing (efficient) allocation of
water among users on a river. The model depicts efficient allocation in
the short run given the ownership of water rights of various seniorities
by the various users. The question of how rights of different seniorities
3. J. CALLAWAY, JR., THE OPTIMAL USE OF SURFACE WATER WITH RETURN FLOWS
PRESENT: A THEORETICAL MODEL FOR DESIGNING ALTERNATIVE RISKS (1979).
4. This thesis was awarded the prize for outstanding M.S. thesis by the American Agricultural
Economics Association in July, 1980.
5. Burness and Quirk, Appropriative Water Rights and the Efficient Allocation of Resources, 69
A.E.R. 25 (1979).
6. C. HOWE & P. ALEXANDER, DROUGHT INDUCED PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES
OF SMALLTOWNS AND RURAL WATER ENTITIES IN COLORADO: THE 1976-1978 DROUGHT
524-50 (1980).

April 1982]

APPROPRIATIVE WATER RIGHTS SYSTEMS

are distributed among users of differing characteristics in the long-run
presents a vital issue, but it requires more research and will not be
addressed here.
The model pictures two users, A upstream and B downstream, having
benefit functions Ba(Qa) and Bb(Qb) respectively, where Bi might be stated
in terms of thousands of dollars per year and Q represents the diversions
of the ith user.' Assuming that benefits increase with diversions up to
some quantity Q, at which marginal (incremental) benefits fall to zero
seems reasonable. Methods of benefit measurement will not be treated
here.
For expository purposes, we will attach weights of ot to the benefits
of A and 3 to those of B. Such weights could reflect a public policy
decision to favor certain uses of water (i.e. agriculture over energy or
recreation). The weights can also illustrate the effect that differing seniorities of water rights can have on water allocation. Economic efficiency
requires discovering the particular pattern of water allocation that will
maximize the net quantifiable benefits resulting from that water use. In
simple mathematics, economic efficiency can be stated as: choosing Qa
and Qb so as to:
(1) maximize {oBa(Qa) + I3Bb(Qb)}
subject to
(2) Qa Qand
Qb 5 Q - cQ.
where Q is the seasonal amount of river flow available at A's headgate
and (c) is the consumptive fraction for A. The first constraint simply says
that A can't divert more water than is in the river, while the second says
that B can divert only what is not consumed by A.
This problem is extremely simple relative to any real-world situations.
Yet quite a few different patterns of optimal allocation can result, the
correct one depending on the data of the case. 8 For example, if Qa and
0b are the volumes of water use at which marginal benefits to the two
users drop to zero, and if Q > Qb + cQa, there really is no allocation
problem. That is, if the river flow is great enough to cover A's greatest
beneficial consumptive use and B's maximum diversion needs, there really
is no economic problem. In another case, if A's benefits are high relative
to B's benefits, the efficient solution would call for A to divert all the
water, leaving only the return flow for B. If B's benefits are the higher,
7. Where B represents the current price of water per acre foot per year and Q, the quantity
(volume) of water diverted by each user.
8. See Appendix for complete solution.
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letting all water by-pass A so that B gets it all may prove to be the best
option.
A "more usual" type of solution would involve A and B sharing the
total flow Q, with A diverting part of the flow while B uses the nondiverted part plus A's return flow. An efficient allocation of this type
occurs only when the (weighted) marginal benefits of A's diversion equal
B's (weighted) marginal benefits, both evaluatedfrom the total system
viewpoint., Mathematically this is stated as:
(3) ( oB
aQa

3

Bb

Qb

aBb

The expression c • B represents the opportunity cost of the last acrefoot diverted by A, i.e. the marginal rate at which B is losing benefits
because of the consumptive uses out of the last acre-foot diverted by A.
Special cases of (3) would include the one in which the social weights
are equal, 13= ot, so that A's marginal benefit just equals the benefits
being foregone at the margin by B. Only in the unlikely case that all of
A's diversions are consumptive (i.e. c = 1)and ot = 1 will economic
efficiency callfor equating the marginal benefits of the two users.
As an example of the application of the efficiency condition given in
(3), suppose that ot = 1, 13= 2, and c = 0.6. Then the efficient allocation
of water between A and B will require that marginal benefits for A should
be 1.2 times the marginal benefits for B.
III. APPROPRIATIVE WATER RIGHTS AND THE EFFICIENT
ALLOCATION OF WATER AMONG USERS.
We can interpret a strict form of appropriative water rights in terms of
condition (3) above. Let us assume that the two parties had filed for rights
in the amounts Q. and Qb, representing the maximum amounts they can
beneficially use, given their land holdings and water demands. Naturally,
one or the other parties would own the senior right. If A is the senior,
appropriations rules operate as if 13= 0, as if no weight is given to B's
benefits, and Qa is determined by letting A divert any quantity up to Qa.
If B is the senior, the opposite is true. Thus, in the short-run, appropriative
water rights clearly violate the conditions needed for economic efficiency
(3).
Thus far, we have treated Q (total volume of divertable water) as a
known constant. In fact, Q is a random variable which fluctuates over
time.
Efficient allocation over time requires that condition (3) hold at all
points in time. In particular, when periods of low stream flow occur,
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condition (3) requires a reduction in water use by both A and B. As the
severity of water shortage increases, reductions in use by both parties
continue in the proportions necessary to maintain condition (3), at least
until one use is reduced to zero. Again, a strict priority system would
not permit this dynamic adjustment to occur, since the senior would get
his or her full decree, Q,, before the other party got any.
The extent to which private profit motives affect the model warrants
consideration. The profit motive may stimulate short-term exchanges of
water that will maintain an efficient allocation among the rights owners.
In the case of only two users along a river, the efficiency condition given
by (3) would tend to be established by bargaining between the two parties.
B would surely see that by borrowing or renting an acre-foot from A
(paying A not to divert an acre-foot so it could flow down to B's headgate),
he would experience a net gain of only a fraction c of an acre-foot. He
therefore would be willing to pay A at most the marginal benefits to be
3Bb

.

-b" If the
8Qb,
marginal benefits to A are below this amount, he should be willing to
rent the water. Thus bargaining should result in an efficient short run
allocation.
If more than two users are involved, however, any transaction between
two users would ignore the return flow effects on the others. The affect
of transactions on return flows presents a case of true externalities, including possible diminished quantity and quality of return flow. Thus,
operation of the market alone will yield inefficient short term transfers.
While water courts will intervene in permanent water rights transfers that
directly impair property rights of third parties, courts generally do not
intervene in short term rental arrangements. In addition to ignoring third
party effects, the market alone fails to account for both the desire to
protect some sectors of the economy (e.g., agriculture) or aesthetic benefits factors denoted by the weights ot and 0 above.
Thus, while privately motivated rentals of water during droughts tend
to promote efficiency, the unaided market process may ignore third party
effects and various social goals or objectives. The market system cannot
yield completely efficient results.
gained from using an additional fraction c of an acre-foot c

-

IV. EXISTING PRACTICES THAT INCREASE THE
EFFICIENCY OF WATER RIGHTS SYSTEMS DURING
DROUGHT
Fortunately, water use patterns need not be as rigid as a strict interpretation of appropriation doctrine would imply. As noted in Section III,
rights holders can share or sell some of their water on a short term basis.
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Even if the water rental process fails to account for third party effects
and various social goals, it greatly improves economic efficiency. This
section describes additional practices observed in Colorado which mitigate
the effects of drought. This description derives primarily from observations made during the drought of 1976-78. 9 Significantly, many of these
actions were locally initiated.
A. Cooperative pooling of water within small drainage basins.
Under such pooling arrangements, the rights holders simply agree to
share the total water available to them. Such arrangements occurred voluntarily in cases involving no more than 5 or 6 parties. In larger areas
involving as many as 15 or 20 rights holders, the local Division Engineer's
Staff sometimes negotiated cooperative agreements. Such arrangements,
involving no payments to the seniors, were surprisingly prevalent in
Colorado during the first year of the drought. They tended to break down
after the first year.
These arrangements improve economic efficiency. They allow all users
access to some water, instead of permitting the seniors to use water up
to the point when its marginal value drops to zero. Also, they encourage
the application of water where its marginal value is highest, rather than
to small increases in the crops of the seniors.
B. Water rental or water banking practices wherein groups of juniors
paid seniorsfor the use of water
These arrangements were frequent and tended to continue through the
drought. The practice involved agriculture-to-agriculture sales, agriculture-to-town sales, and town-to-agriculture sales. The Bureau of Reclamation's "water bank" money was intended to stimulate such arrangements,
although in practice these funds often simply substituted for private money
already being used in such arrangements. The efficiency-increasing effects
here parallel those attributable to cooperative pooling arrangements.
C. Cooperative storage of water
In rural irrigation districts where physical layout of the reservoir and
canal systems permitted, water users consolidated storage of the smaller
volume of available water in the larger, tighter reservoirs. Storage consolidation minimized evaporative and seepage losses.
The Conejos Water Conservancy District provides another example of
a cooperative storage strategy. This District acts as the contracting agency
with the United States for the repayment of the irrigators' portion of the
9. HOWE & ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 43-53.
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cost of construction of Platoro Reservoir, high on the Conejos River in
southern Colorado. Certain provisions of the Rio Grande Compact prevent
the District in recent years from storing water under its reservoir storage
right. In 1980, by voluntary agreement of the irrigators, with the cooperation of the Rio Grande Compact Commission, and under the leadership
of the Colorado State Engineer, direct flow irrigation rights were stored
in Platoro Reservoir and subsequently released to the irrigators throughout
the growing season. Direct flow rights usually cannot be stored legally,
but storing some of these flows earlier in the season meant more water
for everyone in the District. The experiment proved successful and could
be widely imitated.
Both of these storage arrangements promote efficiency. The first reduces
the volumes of water lost through reservoir evaporation and seepage and
can facilitate water rentals over a wider area if the larger reservoir has a
larger command area. The second type, exemplified by the Conejos District storage strategy, permits the conversion of non-usable direct flow
rights into an inventory of water available for use during the entire season.
D. "Futile calls" on deliveries to certain seniors
Under Colorado law, the Division Engineer can declare certain deliveries "futile," or physically impossible to accomplish. Situations involving futile calls arise during periods of very low flow and where a senior
is located far downstream. Strict priority would deny diversions to upstream juniors, but the water would never reach the senior, thus being
wasted-at least for immediate uses. The Division Engineer makes futile
call declarations sparingly, and the senior may seek legal recourse by
getting the water court to set aside the ruling. The reasonableness of such
rulings in the past, however, has made such challenges rare. The extent
of discretion that should be granted the District Engineer in this matter
presents an interesting question.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING
EFFICIENCY-INCREASING CHANGES IN WATER
MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS
Present use patterns emphasize the importance of efficient utilization
of water supplies in the West. We now use about 90 percent of our water
for agricultural purposes and the remaining 10 percent is consumed in
all municipal, domestic, and industrial uses. If agricultural efficiency
could be increased by only 10 percent, the quantity of water available
for municipal, domestic, and industrial uses would be doubled.
The study by Howe, Alexander, et al pointed out the great variability
in climatic and hydrologic conditions that existed within one state during
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the 1976-78 drought."° The study also pointed out many steps that can
be taken at the local level to mitigate the adverse effects of drought (e.g.
by reducing water losses and improving the allocation of water among
users). Thus, local initiative in establishing local climate patterns, identifying available local actions, and acting in a timely fashion comprises
an important component of a successful drought mitigation strategy. Statewide and federal drought programs have a role to pay in mitigation plans.
Unfortunately, these programs frequently serve to discourage rather than
stimulate local initiative."
Some other fundamental institutional reforms that would facilitate the
short-term and long-term flexibility and efficiency of water allocation
include the following possibilities:
1. Moreflexible waterownership rules. The establishment of an agency
that files for (or buys) water rights under state laws and then sells the
water produced to another entity can avert the inflexibilities imposed by
state water laws. The Bureau of Reclamation's sale of Colorado-Big
Thompson water to the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District
provides an extremely effective example of such an arrangement. Federal,
state, or private storage and transport systems all require that appropriate
state water rights be owned before storage can begin. The Colorado-Big
Thompson Project in Colorado (a Bureau of Reclamation Project of the
late 1930s and early post-war period) filed for junior storage rights on
the Upper Colorado River in the 1930s. The Bureau then sold water by
contract to the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District which
distributes the water to its members. The members hold title to the water
under the regulations of the District, free of considerations of state water
law. Owners of water allotments in the District are permitted to sell their
allotments freely to any party within the District boundaries (subject to
approval of the Board of Directors, mostly to protect against pure speculation in water) or to rent any part of it short-term. The high degree of
hydraulic control achieved by the canal and reservoir system and the
retention of ownership of return flows in the District provides protection
of District members from adverse return-flow effects.
The results of this great flexibility in water allocation include (1) very
high efficiency in on-farm irrigation application, and (2) a ready source
of water for new industries or towns established within the District's
boundaries. Congress should encourage the Bureau of Reclamation to
write similar contracts on current projects.
2. Acquisition and Administration of Water Rights by Conservancy
Districts. In areas served by traditional water rights only, the acquisition
10. Id. at 1-23.
11. Id. at 69-79.
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by water conservancy districts of all or a substantial part of the water
rights in a basin would permit the reallocation of those rights on a competitive contract basis. Control of these rights could be acquired by contract with the owner, or title could be obtained through purchase or
condemnation. Conservancy districts, organized under the general conservancy district act 2 or under specific legislature authorization 3 not only
have authority to purchase water rights, but also the "power of eminent
domain and dominant eminent domain . . ." (i.e. the authority to condemn rights held by other public entities).
Annual charges against water users would permit recovery of the cost
of acquisition and contracts could be structured so as to reduce, if not
eliminate, waste. Total control by a conservancy district could either
prevent or accelerate the transfer of water for agriculture to municipal
use, depending on the policy of the governing board of the district. Various
conservation measures such as ditch lining, sprinkler or trickle irrigation
and other water-saving practices could be made a condition precedent to
the granting of a water contract. This practice would result in less frequent
curtailment of use in times of drought, and, in normal times, would make
water available for new uses which could not be served before.
The Southeast Colorado Water Conservancy District provides an example of the use of this type of contract by a conservancy district. Annual
contracts approved by the Board of Directors of the District govern distribution of water from the federal Fryingpan-Arkansas Project. These
contracts need not be renewed and therefore potentially permit great
flexibility in the allocation of water. However, such short term contracts
are likely to inhibit longer term investments dependent on water. The
contract period could be extended.
Most contract arrangements involve a common problem. Some "board"
must decide who gets the contracts. The information requirements for
such a board decision are tremendous, since the board must select from
the changing set of economic actors the party deserving a contract. These
varied information requirements suggest that conservancy districts, having acquired the water rights or having contracted with the Bureau of
Reclamation for water, should be allowed to establish saleable shares and
facilitate the working of a market in these shares. Then the informed
business calculations of different users would determine who would buy
the rights and who would use the water. Such a system would eliminate
the need to establish requirements for canal lining or other conservation
techniques, since the marketability of water would motivate such steps
whenever the value of water warranted them.
12. 37 COLO. REV. STAT. §45 (1973).
13. 37 COLO. REV. STAT. §§46-48 (1973).
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A system of administrative acquisition and distribution of water rights
certainly entails the potential for making all parties better off. Such a
system could also encourage water quantity safeguards and yield handsome monetary compensation for the owners of the acquired rights. Unfortunately, the concept of such pooling has long been anathema to the
holders of senior water rights and is probably politically infeasible at
present. Emotions still overrule reason often in western water affairs.
3. The establishment of a state or interstateagency that would "make
a market" in water rights. Such an agency would stand ready to buy
rights at a known schedule of prices and to sell rights to new users. The
existence of such a program would inform water users of the value of
water and would facilitate the transfer of rights to new, evolving or more
efficient uses. The agency would have to provide compensation for injured
third parties. The creation of a new agency (especially an interstate agency)
with such powers is probably politically impossible at this time because
of state sensitivity to infringements on their controls over water. However,
the success of the processes outlined in paragraphs 1 and 2 above would
logically extend to such an expanded program.
4. Development of climate information andforecasting programsspecific to substate areas. Such a program would define certain sets of

conditions that would aid in the determination of certain "alert" and
"trigger" levels of key climate variables for each substate region so that
local initiatives can be taken in a timely fashion. Such a program would
also facilitate the rational coordination of state and federal programs. 14
5. Extension trainingand informationprograms. Such programs teach
the individual irrigator how and when to apply water more efficiently.
The Bureau of Reclamation has already undertaken initial steps in this
type of program. The Bureau has conducted programs to demonstrate the
appropriate time to apply water in order to maximize benefits and minimize waste. These experiments, in Western Nebraska and in the Grand
Valley area of Colorado, indicate not only water saving potential, but
also a reduction in salinity in return flows from irrigation.
All of these steps warrant serious policy consideration and further study.
Improvements can be made within the existingframework of appropriative
water law to enhance the efficiency of water allocation, in both the short
and long terms. The changes proposed here would encourage short-term
rentals and facilitate long-term transfers of rights, and would consequently
promote greater flexibility in the appropriative system. Greater flexibility
thus appears to be the key to improving the performance of the appropriative water rights system.
14. HOWE & ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 77-79.
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APPENDIX
DERIVATION OF THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR
EFFICIENT WATER ALLOCATION
The Lagrangean function for the problem described by equations (1)
and (2) in the text is:
(4)

L(Qa, Qb,

1

, 1\2) =

ot

*

Ba(Qa) +

13"Bb(Qb)

+ \I(Q-Qa) +

X2(Q - cQa - Qb)

The necessary (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions for a maximum are:
(5)
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(8)
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Qb-

0and -X "h 2
a1\ 2
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In the cases where neither constraint is binding at the optimum, X,*
X2*

= 0 and Q*

= Qa and Qb* =

Qb.

In the cases where the first constraint is binding at the optimum (and
assuming X,* > 0), it follows that Qa* = Q and Qb* = (1 - c)Q or
Qb, whichever is smaller.
Finally, if only the second constraint is binding (and K2* > 0), conditions (5) and (6) combine to give the condition:
(9) 0"< (

a.0O-

aQ aOQb
If the inequality holds strictly, then Qa* = 0 and Qb* = Q. If (9) is an

equality, then A diverts some amount Q* < Q such that the equality
holds.

